Land Cases 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 5 L.Ed. 681, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823) An absolute title to lands cannot exist, at the same time, in different persons, or in different governments. An absolute, must be an exclusive title, or at least a title which excludes all others not compatible with it. All our institutions recognize the absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognize the absolute title of the crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with an absolute and complete title in the Indians.
 
Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Argument & Summation) Private property is owned and controlled by private individuals.  There is no monetary or proprietary interest that a government at any level has in controlling property belonging to a private individual.  The property owner decides with whom he/she wishes to negotiate, procure a contract, dispose of or improve property. 
 
The law recognizes that there may be two "owners" in respect of the same property:  One, the nominal owner; the other, the beneficial owner.  The former is the legal owner; the latter, the equitable owner.  2 Repal. & Law 916. Thus, a trustee and the cestui qui trust are both owners.  Schott v. Harvey, 105 Pa. 222, 51 Am. Rep. 201.  We applied this doctrine in St. Albans v. Avery, 95 Vt. 249, 114 Atl. 31, where we held that the Old Colony Trust Company was the legal owner of the property there in question, and the settlers of the trust, the beneficial owners of it.  So, too, in Payne v. Sheets, 75 Vt. 335, 55 Atl. 656, in construing V. S. 4626 (G. L. 6443), we recognized the fact that the word "owner" is used in different senses, saying that it did not always import an absolute owner, and that "its meaning is often varied according to the connection in which it is used, and it is to be understood according to the subject-matter to which it relates."  The very same thing was held in McFeters v. Pierson, 15 Colo. 201, 24 Pac. 1076, 22 Am. St. Rep. 388.  The very most that reasonably could be claimed is that the owner referred to in this statute is the equitable owner-the beneficial owner-and not the person who holds the legal title.  Fulham parted with the title, but as long as he lived he was the potential owner-the substantial owner-and to all intents and purposes, the real owner.  In re Lines' Est., 155 Pa. 378, 26 Atl. 728; St. Albans v. Avery, 95 Vt. 249, 114 Atl. 31.
 
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION v. SMITH Certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit No. 98-84.  Argued January 20, 1999 - Decided February 23,1999 This case pertains to the right of the Federal Government to have control over private property when a private entity receives Federal financial assistance and benefits from it.  When the Federal Government has a monetary interest in the private entity it can dictate the level of fulfillment required. 
 
“In Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, the question was whether the courts of the District of Columbia might enjoin prospective breaches of racially restrictive covenants. The Court held that it was without jurisdiction to consider the petitioners' argument that the covenant was void because it contravened the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments and their implementing statutes. The Court reasoned, inter alia, that the statutes, including the immediate predecessor of 1982, 6 were inapplicable because "they, like the Constitutional Amendment under whose sanction they were enacted, do not in any manner prohibit or invalidate contracts entered into [392 U.S. 409, 452] by private individuals in respect to the control and disposition of their own property." Id., at 331. 7”
. . to hold property, to buy and sell . . .; he may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment of the right in a particular case; . . . but, unless protected in these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he cannot destroy or injure the right . . . ." 109 U.S., at 17 .”

STS. CONSTANTINE v. NEW BERLIN, No. 04-2326 (7th Cir. February 01, 2005)
Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, if a land-use decision imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise, and the decision maker cannot justify it, the inference arises that hostility to religion influenced the decision.

In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court rendered a decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981), which allowed eminent domain to be exercised when private lands were sought to be taken from private land owners for sale to other private land owners, under the theory that such a “taking” was a public one. This decision became the basis for similar decisions by courts in other states. However, Poletown has now been reversed; see County of Wayne v. Hathcock, (Mich. July 30, 2004), which is posted on FindLaw: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/michiganstatecases/supreme/073004/24048.pdf

HURWITZ v. CITY OF ORANGE, No. G032479 (Cal. 4th App. Dist. September 24, 2004)Judgment pursuant to a condemnation action, awarding plaintiff-property owner money for the interests take by defendant-City, is affirmed where defendant violated a preliminary injunction not to interfere with the plaintiff's use of his land.

Beech Grove Investment v. Michigan Civil Rights Commission; The government cannot force a private property owner to enter a contract with another.  The property owner is free to negotiate his/her own contract and dispose of his/her private property as he/she chooses.  The property owner has full control over his/her property.